

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 10990

EXDIS

DEPT FOR S/P DIRECTOR LAKE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, GW
SUBJECT: U.S./FRG CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICAN POLICY

1. ON JUNE 22, VISITING DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PLANNING STAFF LAKE DISCUSSED AFRICAN POLICY WITH A GROUP OF THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE'S TOP POLICY PLANNERS AND AFRICAN EXPERTS. THE INFORMAL SESSION TOOK PLACE AT THE FRG'S GUEST HOUSE IN BONN (FORMERLY THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESIDENCE) AND LASTED OVER FOUR HOURS, INCLUDING LUNCH. MR. LAKE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MS. WALKER (S/P), EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR SMYSER AND EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER MOATS. THE GERMAN SIDE WAS LED BY PLANNING STAFF (PS) DIRECTOR KINKEL AND INCLUDED PS DEPUTY DIRECTOR WITTE, FONOFF DIRECTOR FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS MUELLER (WHO HAS BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE FONOFF'S NEW AFRICA DIVISION), DR. KAESTNER (PS), BUERSREDDE (PS), ISCHINGER (PS), AND SEITZ (SPEECHWRITER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.) THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION; IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY MR. LAKE. AFTER CLEARANCE, THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO TRANSMIT TEXT TO OTHER
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INTERESTED POSTS.

2. KINKEL OPENED THE MEETING BY THANKING LAKE FOR TAKING TIME TO DISCUSS U.S. AND GERMAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, AN AREA OF IMMEDIATE AND MUTUAL INTEREST. HE THEN GAVE THE FLOOR TO MUELLER WHO BRIEFED GROUP ON STATUS OF CAPE TOWN TALKS. MUELLER REMARKED

THAT IN HIS EXTENSIVE TRAVELS IN AFRICA, HE HAD ENCOUNTERED ALMOST UNIVERSAL DISTRUST OF VORSTER. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS TO TWO FACTORS: FIRST, THE PERVADING IDENTIFICATION OF DUPLICITY WITH VORSTER'S NAME, AND SECOND, GENERAL SKEPTICISM REGARDING VORSTER'S MOTIVATION, I.E., WHY WAS HE RUSHING TOWARD POSITIONS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ESCHEWED. LAKE POINTED OUT THAT THE WEST MUST AVOID TRAPPING ITSELF IN ITS DEALINGS WITH VORSTER OVER NAMIBIA. THE DANGER EXISTS, HE SAID, THAT THE SAG, WHILE APPEARING TO BE MOST FORTHCOMING, WILL ATTEMPT TO BLAME THE WEST FOR ANY FAILURE OF THE TALKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WEST MUST SCRUPULOUSLY AVOID BEING PERCEIVED AS NEGOTIATING FOR OR ON THE SIDE OF THE SAG VIS-A-VIS SWAPO AND OTHERS.

3. ACCORDING TO LAKE, THE VORSTER - MONDALE TALKS IN VIENNA DID NOT SIGNIFY THE BEGINNING OF ANY US-SAG NEGOTIATIONS. RATHER, THEY WERE A MEANS OF BRINGING WESTERN POSITIONS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SAG. IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND OTHERS WERE DRAWING "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE" FROM THE CAREFUL U.S. CALL FOR "FULL PARTICIPATION". KINKEL AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE" IS A TREMENDOUSLY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT SUBJECT. THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION TO HIM, HOWEVER, IS HOW THE SAG IS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 10990

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APPROACHED. ANY PRESSURE EMPLOYED BY THE WEST TO INFLUENCE SAG INTERNAL POLICY MUST BE OF THE TYPE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SAG.

4. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO KINKEL, THE SAG APPEARS TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY MONDALE'S MESSAGE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF NO CHANGE IN ITS APARTHEID POLICY. KINKEL SAID HE WAS SLIGHTLY WORRIED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REALIZATION WOULD HAVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS. PRESSURE SHOULD NOT BE SO GREAT AS TO FORCE SOUTH AFRICA FURTHER INTO A LARGER MENTALITY. AS HE VIEWED THE SITUATION, THE WEST HAS A COMMON OBJECTIVE VIS-A-VIS SOUTH AFRICA: TO KEEP SOUTH AFRICA OUT OF SOVIET HANDS AND WESTERN CHANCES OF DOING SO ARE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE LEVEL OF US INVOLVEMENT. GERMANY HAS SOME LEVERAGE BUT THE REAL PRESSURE MUST COME FROM THE US. IN THIS REGARD, THE WEST, AND SPECIFICALLY THE US AND FRG, MUST TRY TO STRENGTHEN, CONCERT AND CONCENTRATE ITS POLICIES ON THE PLANNING AND WORKING LEVELS. EVENTUALLY THIS WILL NECESSITATE AN AGREEMENT ON A METHOD OF PRESSURING THE SAG BY THE US AND THE NINE.

5. KINKEL BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE MODELS FOR CHANGES WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.
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LAKE RESPONDED THAT BY PROVIDING THE SAG WITH AN OUTLINE FOR CHANGE THE WEST COULD TRAP ITSELF INTO A SITUATION WHICH MIGHT BE CHARACTERIZED AS "WE (SAG) HAVE FULFILLED EIGHT OF YOUR FIFTEEN REQUIREMENTS, NOW WHERE IS OUR REWARD." LAKE ADDED THAT THE US AND OTHERS HAVE GIVEN THE SAG ILLUSTRATIONS (SUCH AS CHANGES IN THE PASSPORT LAWS) OF ITS LONG-TERM GOALS IN REFORMING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY. TO DO MORE MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

6. KINKEL RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF HOW WESTERN OBJECTIVES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE ADVANCED. HE OBSERVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA CANNOT BE COERCED TO ACCEPT "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE". A MODEL FOR WHAT WE REALLY SEEK MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR US IN EVALUATING PROGRESS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT TRANSMITTED TO THE SAG. FROM THE ENSUING DISCUSSION BETWEEN LAKE AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN SIDE EMERGED A GENERAL IDEA THAT ACADEMIC STUDIES MIGHT BE SOLICITED AND PASSED

INFORMALLY TO THE SAG WITHOUT FORMALLY ASSOCIATING OURSELVES WITH THEIR CONTENTS. SOME STUDIES HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE AND THE CONCENSUS WAS THAT THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

7. THE GROUP THEN ASKED WHAT TYPES OF PRESSURE COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE SAG TO PRODUCE A MEANINGFUL CHANGE IN THE APARTHEID SYSTEM WITHOUT BLOCKING NECESSARY PROGRESS ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA QUESTIONS. LAKE OBSERVED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE LARGELY A QUESTION OF TACTICS. POSITIVE MOVES BY THE SAG ON THE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA FRONTS SHOULD BE REWARDED, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO EXPRESS DISPLEASURE OVER SOUTH AFRICAN PROGRESS ON

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APARTHEID. RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA WERE SHORT-TERM PROBLEMS; ABOLITION OF APARTHEID, AS MONDALE HAD POINTED OUT, WAS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE. MUELLER OBSERVED THAT THE EC'S AFRICAN EXPERTS HAD BEGUN LOOKING INTO THE POTENTIAL PROGRESSIVE INFLUENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN. THE GROUP DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITIES OF COORDINATION AMONG FIRMS BASED IN SOUTH AFRICA ON CODES OF CONDUCT. SUCH ACTION WOULD APPROACH THE REAL ECONOMIC BASIS FOR MUCH OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY. KINKEL RETURNED TO HIS POSITION THAT ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SAG, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL, MUST BE EMPLOYED INDIRECT PRESSURE FROM CHURCHES, BUSINESSMEN, ORGANIZATIONS AND FOUNDATIONS MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE NERVES OF THE SAG. THE WEST SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT BLACK AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA WHICH ARE INCLINED IN THE DIRECTIONS WE PREFER.

8. ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS, LAKE OBSERVED THAT A CHAPTER SEVEN FINDING AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WOULD POSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES TO THE WEST, ESPECIALLY FOR THE BRITISH. HE SAID HE HAD OBSERVED NO GREAT DISPOSITION WITHIN THE USG IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS, BUT THAT ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US, IN DISCUSSION WITH AFRICAN LEADERS, HAD NOT COMPLETELY RULED SANCTIONS OUT. POSSIBILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 10990

EXDIS

OIL EMBARGO (AND HOW THIS MIGHT DIFFER FROM ACTION UNDER CHAPTER SIX AND SEVEN) WERE UNDER STUDY; NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. KINKEL'S REACTION WAS THAT WESTERN INTERESTS WERE NOT SERVED BY A WEAK SOUTH AFRICA. ANY MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MUST, THEREFORE, BE CONSIDERED VERY CLOSELY, SINCE THEY WOULD HURT THOSE WE ARE TRYING TO HELP.

9. LAKE WAS ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT US VIEWS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. HE POINTED TO PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THIS QUESTION WHICH SHOWED US STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE AREA WERE MAINLY ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS AND FREEDOM OF TRAVEL AROUND THE CAPE. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY DEPENDED ON THE EXPORT OF THESE RAW MATERIALS, A FACT THAT WAS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE. PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF THE CAPE WAS NOT A FUNCTION OF THE ORIENTATION OF THE SAG. INTERFERENCE IN FREE TRANSIT WOULD BE A MOST SERIOUS MATTER--A STEP WHICH THE SOVIETS OR OTHERS WERE UNLIKELY TO TAKE. SINCE US NAVAL VESSELS NO LONGER CALL ON SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS, NOTHING MORE WAS TO BE LOST HERE; IN FACT, IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS MIGHT FACILITATE FUTURE ACCESS. KINKEL SAID HE FOUND THIS ASSESSMENT INTERESTING SINCE THE
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GOVERNMENT IN BONN HAD BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE OPPOSITION FOR JEOPARDIZING WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS BY ITS SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY.

10. LAKE, LATER IN THE MEETING, RAN THROUGH A LIST

OF PROBLEM AREAS IN AFRICA AS PERCEIVED IN WASHINGTON. IN GENERAL TERMS, HE SAID, THE U.S. SEEKS POSITIVE POLICIES, NOT KNEE JERK REACTIONS TO SOVIET OR CUBAN INITIATIVES. THE US APPRECIATES AND WILL SUPPORT AFRICAN NATIONALISM, WHICH IS POTENTIALLY THE MOST POWERFUL ANTI-SOVIET FORCE IN AFRICA TODAY. THE US WILL STRIVE TO EMPHASIZE THE STRENGTH OF ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TIES TO THE AFRICAN STATES AND WILL BE WILLING TO TALK, IN A SPIRIT OF OPENNESS, EVEN IN FORA WHERE IT IS LIKELY TO MEET STRONG DISAGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, THE US WILL EXTEND ITS EFFORTS TO CURB ARMS PROLIFERATION IN AFRICA AND WILL STRIVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS CONCERNS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMITED TO AREAS OF BLACK/WHITE CONFRONTATION. (COMMENT: KINKEL POINTED OUT THAT GERMAN POLICY ON ARMS SHIPMENTS WAS ALREADY QUITE RESTRICTIVE. HE ASKED FOR INFORMATION FROM THE US SIDE ON THIS PROBLEM WITH WHICH THE FRG WAS NOT VERY FAMILIAR. END COMMENT.) LAKE LISTED THE HORN, THE SUDAN, SOMALIA, ZAIRE, THE WESTERN SAHARA, IN ADDITION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE US ATTENTION IS BEING FOCUSED.

11. ON THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE SHIFT BY SOMALIA AWAY FROM SOVIET INFLUENCE, LAKE OBSERVED THAT SUCH A CHANGE WOULD NOT COME WITHOUT A PRICE. SOMALIA MAY SEEK, AS QUID PRO QUO, WESTERN ACQUIESCENCE OR SUPPORT FOR ITS REVANCHIST CLAIMS ON THE OGADEN, DJIBOUTI, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND PARTS OF KENYA. THE WEST MUST ALSO BE SURE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANY COMMITMENTS MADE TO THE SIAD GOVERNMENT. MUELLER ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE CONFLICTING SIGNALS EMANATING FROM MOGADISCIO, IT DOES SEEM CLEAR THAT SIAD WANTS TO OPEN UP TO THE WEST. HOWEVER, SIAD FACES THREE CONSTRAINTS: ONE, THE DEEP INROADS OF MARXIST THOUGHT INTO SOMALIAN SOCIETY; SECOND, SOMALIA'S ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ARMS; AND THREE, SIAD'S PERSONAL FEAR OF OPENING TOO QUICKLY TO THE WEST SINCE HE REALIZES HE MAY NOT BE VIEWED AS THE IDEAL POST-CHANGE LEADER. MUELLER TOLD THE GROUP (SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING THAT IT BE VERY CLOSELY HELD), THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN SOMALIA HAS RECENTLY BEEN ASKED BY THE SOMALIS FOR EQUIPMENT OF THE TYPE USED FOR GUERILLA WARFARE. THE BRITISH ARE REPORTEDLY STILL CONSIDERING THE REQUEST. MUELLER HYPOTHESIZED THAT THE REQUEST HAD COME ONLY AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD REFUSED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE OF THIS TYPE.

12. A CONSENSUS EMERGED FROM THE MEETING, VERY STRONGLY EXPRESSED BY THE GERMAN SIDE, THAT WESTERN CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WOULD BE THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND INDEED AFRICA AS A WHOLE. KINKEL SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT NEW CHANNELS OF

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EXDIS

COMMUNICATIONS BE ESTABLISHED TO FACILITATE DIALOGUES IN THE PRE-FORMULATION STAGE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT. SUCH DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PLANNING STAFFS WERE EXTREMELY VALUABLE IN HIS VIEW. HE ALSO RECOMMENDED MORE DETAILED AND FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG WORKING LEVEL EXPERTS TO SHARE AND DEVELOP NEW IDEAS. KINKEL PROMISED TO TURN OVER TO THE US SIDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A COPY OF THE PLANNING STAFF'S COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF FRG POLICY FOR AFRICA. THIS STUDY IS NOT YET COMPLETE BUT SHOULD BE IN AT LEAST WORKING DRAFT FORM BY MID TO LATE JULY. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO TRANSMIT A COPY AT THAT STAGE. LAKE, WHO HAD EARLIER MENTIONED THE PLANS OF SECRETARY VANCE TO GIVE A COMPREHENSIVE SPEECH ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN POLICY, UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT SPEECH -- PROJECTED TO BE GIVEN JULY 1 -- AS SOON AS HE POSSIBLY COULD.

13. COMMENT: THE MEETING WHICH BEGAN AT 9:30 A.M., CONTINUING THROUGH LUNCH TO MID-AFTERNOON, WAS CHARACTERIZED BY HARMONIOUS YET SERIOUS GIVE AND TAKE THROUGHOUT. THE GERMAN SIDE LATER EXPRESSED THE

APPRECIATION FOR THE INSIDE LOOK LAKE WAS ABLE TO
PROVIDE ON US AFRICAN POLICY AND HOPED THAT SUCH
EXCHANGES WOULD BECOME MORE COMMON IN THE FUTURE.
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KINKEL, IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE POLITICAL
COUNSELOR, REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT WESTERN INTEREST
IN CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICY NOT BE
PUSHED SO FAR AS TO ENDANGER MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON
THE MORE URGENT QUESTIONS OF NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA.
HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS APPREHENSION
HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LESSENED BY HIS CONTACT
WITH LAKE.
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